George Cole was born in 1887, the fifth child of William Cole, an agricultural labourer who had been born in 1850 and lived in Ashreigney with his wife Thomasina who had been born in 1856.  It was a large family, of thirteen children, living at the time of the 1891 census at Muet House, Ashreigney, and then in 1901 at Locks Cottage.  In 1910, George Cole, aged 23 and working as an agricultural labourer, married Hannah Harris, aged 22, who had been born in Monkokehampton.  Her parents, together with her two sisters, had moved around the area, living in 1891 at Mount Pleasant, Hatherleigh and by 1901 in Barnstaple Street, Winkleigh.  When the war broke out George and Hannah were living at Sedgets in Lowertown, Winkleigh.  By the time that George Cole was enlisted it was probably in late 1916 or into 1917.

      We know from the Devonshire regimental records that George Cole enlisted in Winkleigh.  The Chumleigh Deanery Magazine does not include his name among those seeking to join the 6th Devons Territorials or indeed the New Army 8th or 9th Battalions of the Devons when war broke out.  Since his medal record shows that he was not in France in 1915, George either attested under the Derby Scheme in late 1915 in order to be sure to be able to choose his regiment as and when he was called, or he most probably waited until he was conscripted, sometime in 1916 or because of his age and as a married man, even later.  The Derby Scheme, first announced to the country on 15th October 1915, comprised a personal canvass of every man between the ages of eighteen and forty-one on the basis of the National Register.  Each man was asked either to join at once or attest, and committees were set up in every locality.  In Winkleigh, Col. Alexander was in the forefront.  Single men and married men formed two groups: each were sub-divided into a further twenty-three groups according to age, to be called up in strict order, starting with the single men aged 19, and the married men to be called only after the single men had all been enlisted.  Tribunals were set up for those seeking exemption from attestation or postponement on grounds of special hardship or essential war-work.  Those who attested could still, in theory, choose their branch of the army in which to serve although pressure was brought on as many as possible to serve in the infantry.  The scheme was no more than a partial success, as many argued that since three million men had already come forward, 75% over and above the numbers Kitchener had called for, there was no need for further recruitment.  Fewer than half those available had attested, the tribunals had been too liberal in granting exemptions, and more men were indeed needed when the Derby scheme was finally closed on 15th December.  As a result, the conscription bill affecting single men was introduced into the House of Commons on 5th January 1916, becoming law on 27th.  In March 1916 the youngest group of married men who had attested were of necessity also called up.  A second military service bill, introduced on 3rd May 1916, became law on 25th May, and extended the liability for military service to all men between eighteen and forty-one.  If George Cole now aged 37, had not already joined, he would eventually be called upon to do so.  His records show that he was first enlisted in the Devonshire Regiment.

      Once in the army, George would have carried out his initial training in the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion of the Devons in the Exeter depot before being drafted.  The initial task of the 3rd Battalion, the Regiment’s training battalion, was to keep the two regular army 1st and 2nd Battalions, up to strength.  The early demands for drafts were insatiable, so great were the casualties in the first months of the war, Between January 1st and April 30th 1915 no less than 675 other ranks were drafted to the 1st Battalion, and 795 to the 2nd.  34 officers were also drafted, some to battalions other than the Devons.  In those early days, recruits flooded in to the 3rd Battalion to replace those drafted and in far greater numbers than could be housed, equipped, trained or even supplied with uniforms, rifles or basic military equipment.  As the war went on, of course, these difficulties were overcome, and the steady flow of officers and other ranks through the battalion throughout the war never ceased - new recruits, officers and men being returned for duty after sickness or having recovered from wounds, and newly-gazetted officers from Sandhurst or the Officer Cadet battalions (for example the Public Schools Battalion).  From early on in the war the exclusive nature of the 3rd Devons, in common with many 3rd Battalions of other Regiments, began to break down, as battalions in urgent need of reinforcements were sent drafts from regiments other than their own.  It was in this way that George Cole, having been enlisted in the Devons, found himself posted instead to the 1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry.

      The definitive history of the 1st Battalion, by Major Majendie, quotes the battalion war diary that while in ‘rest’ between 10th and 21st August 1916, a huge draft of 121 men arrived, among them 60 Hampshire cyclists and 30 from the West Somerset Yeomanry.  This was followed almost at once by a second draft of 80 men from the Devons.  The Battalion War Diary reported : ‘A draft of 80 arrived, a good many being Devons. Nearly all had been out before’.  Private George Cole might have been among them, but it seems unlikely.  Further drafts were received however, usually on the many occasions when the battalion was in a period of rest, so that we cannot be definite as to when George Cole was posted.  Very seldom was any mention made in the War Diary of the units of origin in the draft, and there is only the one reference to postings from the Devons: we assume of course that reinforcements for the most part arrived from the Somerset Light Infantry’s own 3rd Battalion.

Drafts of ‘other ranks’ joining the 1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry, September 1916 - November 1917

1916 September 23rd	83	In rest at Cerisy
September 24th	180	In rest at Cerisy
December 20th	64	In rest at Maurapas
December 21st	13	In rest at Maurapas
1917 January 1st	63	From Rouen. Mostly from North Somerset Yeomanry.
January 5th	22	From Rouen
January 29th	77
January 31st	58
February 5th	57
February 6th	19
February 26th	63
April 23rd	About 174	Draft from Savy (4th Division Depot)
Maynd	25	Arrived from Base
June 3nd	7
June 4th	50
July 11th	71
July 21st	12
July 25th	5
September 3rd	194	From Savy.  A good draft with 7 or 8 months training.
October 15th	65
November 12th	99	In rest.  Drafts from the 7th and 23rd City of London Regiments

      George Cole’s arrival with the Somerset Light Infantry (SLI) would most likely have been in 1917 or even early 1918.  Certainly he was very lucky if he survived more than eight or nine months in the battalion, the average expected survival time of any infantry soldier.  (Incidentally, 2nd/Lts. had an even shorter average span, usually no more than three months for the lucky ones.)  With this in mind the large draft of September 3rd 1917 could have marked George Cole’s possible arrival, since it seems they were all ‘first timers’ in France, although we do read later in the War Diary that the draft was largely comprised of 19 year olds.  Perhaps more likely was the draft of October 15th 1917, making up some of the losses after the Battalion’s experience of Passchendaele.

      The experiences of the 1st Battalion during 1916 and 1917 are typical of a regular army ‘crack’ battalion that provided the leadership and example of our forces around whom the Territorial and ‘New Army’ battalions were gathered and trained.  It seems almost miraculous that in spite of the horrendous casualties that had destroyed the old army by late 1915, to be replaced first by volunteers, then from 1916 by conscripts and finally the very young soldiers of 1918, the spirit of these ‘regular’ 1st and 2nd Battalions of our old army was somehow preserved.

      During August 1916 until the second week of September the Battalion was in and out of the line in the Hooge sector of the Ypres salient.  The Battalion was then employed on a curious but extremely pleasant ‘stunt’ which entailed moving to Dunkirk and pretending each day to embark on trawlers in the harbour, in the hope that German spies might be fooled into believing that a British landing was planned on the Belgian coast behind enemy lines, a ruse designed in order to keep large German reserves on the coast in readiness.  There is no report that anyone was fooled in the least!

      Following this, the battalion moved to the Somme area, for the next attack on 17th September 1916 at Le Transloy.  Fortunately the SLI was in reserve, and casualties were slight, but the weather was so wet and cold that the entire battalion was suffering from exhaustion, exposure and trench feet.  The incessant rain meant that the communication trenches were waist deep in water, and the actual trenches were waterlogged and collapsing.  Back in reserve it was as much as everyone could do to furnish carrying parties at night. On 25th September 1916 the battalion finally moved back into rest and re-training for a month at Cerisy.

      Back in the line in October, the SLI were just North of Rancourt, experiencing the very worst of the winter mud of 1916-17, in which it was possible to be lost and drowned at any time, and in which a period of 24 hours was as much as anyone could endure in the front trenches.  There could be little action by either side as the Germans were suffering in similar fashion, and men even died in the mud on the nightly carrying parties.  The War Diary reported both terrible events and their consequences, for example:

October 22nd 1916: Medical inspection by Battalion Medical Officer: 2 officers and 66 men to hospital suffering from trench feet and exhaustion. 3 officers and 80 men to Transport Lines for rest and attention. Brigade Medical Officer arrived and inspected Battalion. Fully upheld Regt. M.O.s decisions, and also added a few more men for attention.

      On October 27th the battalion again moved back into rest, but was back in the line on December 15th, taking over a sector from the French.  The pattern of ‘in and out’ went on all through January and February, snow falling, trenches falling in, full of mud and water, exhaustion prevalent.  The Battalion War Diary reported:

December 15th 1916: Batt. Relieved 1st Royal Warwick Regt.  In the trenches.  Conditions up to and in trenches fearful.  Very dark.  Several men found in the morning stuck in mud and had to be dug out.  Some men only got out by leaving their thigh boots behind.  Conditions in front line almost impossible.

Finally, on March 4th the Battalion was transferred to the 4th army area, in preparation and training for the forthcoming spring offensive, the attack at Arras and Vimy Ridge on April 9th 1917.

      The attack was planned on a wide front from Vimy Ridge in the North to south of the River Scarpe.  The SLI were in support and succeeded in passing through the first three lines and capturing the fourth line.  Meanwhile, on the left, Vimy Ridge was captured by the Canadians.  The battalion lost 50 other ranks and 2 officers killed or wounded, casualties described as ‘light’.  Further attempts to move forward, however, on 10th April, failed because there was no artillery support (communications with the rear area having completely broken down) and casualties were very heavy.  A further attack on 11th was no more successful.  The battalion remained in the line until 14th, suffering the abominable weather which had marked the whole attack and were withdrawn, completely exhausted.  10 officers and 127 men had been killed or wounded.  The remainder moved into rest on April 21st for 7 days.

      The battle of Arras was resumed on April 23rd 1917, and on May 3rd, the battalion was ordered to attack the village of Roeux at 3.45 a.m.  The attack failed.  Roeux Wood was not sufficiently shelled, machine guns could not be located and the maps were incorrect.  A further 8 officers and 132 men were killed or wounded, and the SLI remained in the line until May 14th, when another month of rest was granted.  Back in the line, opposite Roeux, on June 11th, a period of quiet activity followed but with plenty of sniping, trench mortaring and patrolling to break the monotony.  The trenches were again abominable, flooded and collapsing even in summer.  Each Brigade in the Division was in the line for 16 days (8 in the front line, 8 in support) followed by 16 days divisional reserve, when of course incessant numbers of working parties had to come up every night for wiring and trench repairs.

      On September 4th 1917 the 4th Division went into training for the next major attack, taking their turn in the Passchendaele offensive, as the British High Command systematically rotated 55 Divisions (some 98% of all the British infantry divisions on the Western Front) through the continuing carnage.  Passchendaele, known as the third battle of Ypres, lasted from 31st July to 16th November 1917 as British and Germans fought each other to utter exhaustion in a welter of mud and blood.  The Germans by this time had learnt to dispense with lines of vulnerable defensive trenches which could be destroyed by the artillery, and to rely instead on a system based on scattered concrete pill-boxes which could both support each other while withstanding efforts to destroy them, and to make possible immediate counter-attacks in force to regain any ground lost.  The British had to evolve entirely new tactics to deal with these changes, and this required very new and careful training.

      On September 18th the Battalion moved into Belgium, one mile south of Poperinghe, for intensive training, and on October 1st into the front line for the next attack.  Heavy rain worsened the already atrocious conditions of the ground with the abominable mud that slowed down any advance, and the shell holes full of water.  The Battalion attack of October 4th 1917 took place just south-east of Poelkapelle in the north-west area of the Ypres salient, the objective being a group of so-called ‘houses’ just south-west of the village.  Assembly took place during the night for zero hour at dawn.  During 3rd October, owing to the absence of any kind of jumping off trenches, tapes were laid across the mud to form the assembly line; not a single tree or building was standing.  The mud was so bad that duck-boards had to be laid, even to get the men into their forward positions.  The tracks were of course continually shelled by the Germans, but the Battalion was in position by 11.00 pm, with the loss of only one man.  The attack took place on a two platoon front, the rear platoons dealing with the pill-boxes that had been bypassed in the forward attack.  Unfortunately the creeping barrage fell somewhat short and a number of men were killed by ‘friendly fire’.  Moving on from the first objective, the attack was stalled for an hour to clean the rifles and Lewis Guns choked with mud, before moving on to reach the final objective.  The ‘houses’ were taken and a line reached just west of Poelkapelle, after which counter-attacks were repulsed.  Losses were dreadful: 1 officer killed and 8 wounded, 282 other ranks killed, wounded or missing.  The Battalion War Diary report included:

‘A satisfactory feature of the day was the way in which the last draft of about 200 behaved.  Though for the most part only 19 years of age and never having been under fire before, they showed the greatest keenness and determination, and behaved excellently.’

For many it was their first and last battle.

      On 7th October 1917 the remains of the Battalion went into Divisional Reserve, eventually in Poperinghe, where drafts were received.  On 18th, the 4th Division was returned to the 3rd Army, to spend the winter in and out of the line in the Monchy area, Arras, where repairs of the entire trenches in the sector were organised on a Divisional basis by the Royal Engineers, battalions providing the labour force.  As a result the winter trenches were well revetted and duck-boarded, with reasonable dug-outs, some even heated for the drying of gum-boots.  Whale-oil was used to combat trench-foot and hot meals were provided in the forward lines.  Health improved.  The tour was 4 days in the front lines, 4 in support and 4 days in reserve, followed by 12 days in Divisional reserve either in Arras or in camp on the Arras-Cambrai road, during which time, of course, large working parties had to be found.  In spite of much work, heavy rain and frost in December and January played havoc with the trenches, communication trenches filled with water and men had to move to and fro by night in the open.  Plans were drawn up to counter the German attack in the spring, now seemingly inevitable, and as much training as possible carried out.

      The German offensive, codenamed ‘Michael’ opened on March 21st 1918.  This was soon followed by ‘Geogette’ offensive on April 9th.  The immediate objective of the 4th Division was to preserve Bethune, situated behind the main defensive line of the La Bassee Canal.  La Bassee itself was in German hands.  Between Bethune and the canal and in the area north of the canal, including the old 1915 battlefields of Festubert and Givenchy, a large number of Battalions of 3rd, 61st and 55th Division were concentrated, using reconstituted old French trenches and their strong support lines just north of Bethune.  The 1st Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry, part of 11th Brigade, were among them, with the line held by the 4th Division itself resting on the right on the north bank of the river Scarpe.  This position was considerably exposed by the ‘Michael’ attack, and in spite of all the elaborate defences that had been built during the winter, Monchy had to be abandoned without a fight, much to the frustration of the Battalion.  Numbers were much reduced for the next battle, and by 29th March the Battalion had lost 3 officers and 80 other ranks.  On April 9th the Battalion went into Brigade reserve to receive a draft of 3 officers and 162 men, just missing the opening of ‘Georgette’ on April 9th.  The 4th Division, with the 56th Division on its left, met the onslaught with great determination and courage.  After three days, on April 12th the 11th Brigade went into the line again, the Battalion holding positions along the southern bank of the La Bassee Canal.

      The La Bassee Canal itself was part of the British front line defence system for a distance of some 7000 yards (about 4 miles) before the line turned sharply north.  At this corner there was a nasty salient jutting into the British defensive system, which the 4th Division was obviously very concerned to eliminate.  The plan to do this involved the capture of the village of Riez du Vinage.  The operation was bound to the difficult and costly, involving an assault across the canal under shell and machine-gun fire.

      On April 12th 1918 the 1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry had moved up to the line, first by bus and then by marching, from a point south of Arras to the village of Bellerive, about a mile and a half behind the British front line along the canal.  An already reduced battalion, the Somersets were covering a length of about 2 miles.  British defences were indeed very thinly spread, and in fact, this part of the line was being held by the confused remains of various Divisions and formations, including men from the 51st Division and the 3rd Division, dismounted cavalry from King Edward’s Horse and men of the Tank Corps who had been dismounted and who had brought with them their Lewis Guns.  The canal remained the last natural defensive position before the Germans could break through and reach Bethune, Lilliers and the coal-fields of Bruay, and it was imperative that it should be held.  The operation order for the attack contained the following order:

‘The village will be taken at all costs, and every man in the Battalion will be used to obtain this object if necessary.’

For an image of the Operations map of The Lys for the 13th April 1918 click HERE.

      The attack on 14th April 1918 did not go quite according to plan, but by 7.15 pm the village was in British hands, the troops began to dig in, and shortly before dawn two platoons of the Rifle Brigade came up as reinforcements.  At dawn on 15th, a new German counter-attack from the North was dispersed by the Battalion’s machine guns, inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy.  An attempt was made on 15th to capture a wood adjacent to the village, the Bois de Pacaut, but the plan was hastily improvised and unsupported by artillery.  ‘A’ company lost 50% casualties in a hopeless attack.  (Incidentally it was in this action that another Winkleigh man, Private Herbert Lugg, was killed and who also has his name on the Memorial Cross; he had also transferred from the Devons to the Somersets.)  The following day the Germans retired from the area, and thus ended the otherwise successful operations carried out by the Battalion on April 14th, 15th and 16th.  The results of their endeavours were certainly impressive.  The village of Riez du Vinage had been captured and a bridgehead secured across the canal.  A battery of British field-guns and a second battery of 4.5 howitzers had been recaptured.  Sixteen German light machine guns, a heavy mortar and four heavy machine guns were taken, plus a re-captured Vickers gun.  The equivalent of a German battalion had been killed, captured or wounded.  135 prisoners were sent to the rear.  But our losses had also been severe in this very difficult action.  5 officers (4 wounded) were casualties, together with 210 other ranks, killed, wounded or missing.

      During the night the Battalion went into rest at Cense la Vallee, and for the next few days acted as Brigade reserve, on immediate call.  11th Brigade were then ordered to make a further attack on the Bois de Pacaut.  The SLI were in reserve but even so lost a further 25 men and two officers from hostile shelling, which also killed the Brigade-Major when visiting the new line in the Bois de Pacaut.  It was a horrible position to hold.  Two more officers were killed moving up into the front line on April 23rd and the canal bank was shelled continuously, day and night.  Owing to the marshy ground trenches could be dug to only three feet and sandbagged breastworks had to raise the parapets.  However, during the night 28th-29th April the Battalion moved back into rest at Censee la Vallee, and a quieter time was had by all during the static warfare of the summer.  The Germans could advance no further, although further attacks were certainly expected.  Meanwhile the British army rebuilt its defences and quietly gathered its strength for what proved to be the final offensive of the war.  Gas shells were used to a great extent on both sides, the Battalion was very active both in patrolling and destroying individual German pillboxes, capturing the occupants.

      In order to avert the danger of a renewed German offensive, the supreme commander, Foch, now urged the opening of a renewed allied offensive, and Haig decided as a priority to free Amiens from the danger of German artillery.  4th Army was to attack due east of Villiers-Bretonneux.  Rawlinson (again proving to be a superb tactician) requested reinforcements from the Canadian Corps (still guarding Vimy Ridge and the Bethune coalfields), in order to capture Peronne in the first stage of what was to become the final break-through of the war.  The Battle of Amiens opened on August 8th, and became in Ludendorf’s words ‘the black day of the German army’.  The attack was launched with the utmost secrecy, troop movements of the Canadians and Australians concealed, over a thousand guns smuggled into position and registered on known German artillery positions, and six hundred and four tanks assembled, their noise concealed by Royal Air Force squadrons.  Aided by morning mist the Canadians, Australians and British on the left moved forward, advancing some seven miles on the first day.  However, by the third day only 67 tanks had survived and progress ground to a halt after a total advance of 10 miles.

      It was now the turn of Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army to take up the advance, attacking between Albert and Arras towards Bapaume, on 21st August, covering the old battlefields of the 1916 Somme offensive.  Two hundred tanks were hastily assembled and again moved forward under the protection of the mist and a creeping barrage, but the attack soon slowed.  Over half of Byng’s infantry were no more than inadequately trained boys, hastily rushed to France and now experiencing their first action, but in spite of this they displayed magnificent heroism in repulsing a ferocious German counter-attack north of Albert.  Albert itself was re-taken and the line extended south to link up with the advances of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army.  By the evening of August 22nd the line extended along the edge of the old Somme battlefields.  The following day ‘Byng’s Boys’ began an advance of three miles across the old wasteland, a second ‘black day’ for the Germans, and by 29th Bapaume had fallen.

      On August 26th Plumer’s First Army joined the attack between Arras and the northern end of the Siegfried Line, which itself had been extended north by another defensive line known as the ‘Drocourt-Queant Switch’.  It was here that 4th Division were to play their part.  Thus it was that for the 1st Battalion of the SLI, their period of static trench warfare came to an end on August 23rd when the Battalion moved from their billets in Censee la Vallee by various stages to St. Lawrence Camp, near Chateau de la Haie, which was reached on August 27th.  The task that lay before them was to take part in this first stage of the battle, the attack on the Drocourt-Queant Switch. As a preliminary operation, the marshy area at the junction of the Cojeul and Sensee rivers had to be taken, in the area of the villages of Monchy-le-Preux and Boiry Notre-Dame, north of the road leading from Arras to Cambrai.  For this purpose the Division was transferred temporarily to the Canadian Corps.  It was in this particular operation that Private George Cole was to lose his life.

      On the 28th orders were received to relieve the 4th Canadian Battalion that night.  At 2.0pm the Battalion were transported by bus to Arras with the intention of being carried further along the Arras-Cambrai road to the back area of the Canadian line at Monchy-le-Preux.  The road, however was under persistent shelling so the Battalion marched across country to the assembly at the Bois du Vert, and thence to an area south of Boiry Notre Dame, for the dawn attack on 29th.  One Second-Lieutenant and 20 men had already become casualties from shell fire.  The task was immensely difficult.  Nothing was known of the ground to be covered or the enemy’s positions, the ground was marshy, the rivers presented distinct obstacles and the men had arrived dog-tired.  There was to be no artillery support.  North of the River Cojeul the line hung in the air and ‘A’ company moved forward to try and cover the advance to the junction of the two rivers.  Light Company and ‘B’ were to cross the Cojeul and seize the Sensee River bank south-west of the junction.  ‘C’ were in reserve.  A series of strong-point had to be captured by ‘fire and movement’ and after three and a half hours the objective was reached, after which a staff officer recorded that had Brigade realised how difficult was the operation, the Battalion would never have been ordered to achieve it, but this did not restore the lives of the 50 or so casualties that had been lost, including a high number of NCOs.

      The attack was renewed by the Battalion on 30th between the Sensee and the village of Eterpigny.  Prospects of success were very poor.  The men had had almost no sleep since 27th–28th, they had been wet through for 24 hours and were now desperately short of NCOs.  Assembly was between the two rivers for zero at 4.00pm.  Our artillery opened a barrage on Eterpigny and the adjacent wood at 3.45 but unfortunately the assembly area was heavily shelled in retaliation and many men were killed before the start.  However, the Germans then retired quickly and the objective gained, but at a huge cost of 5 officers killed, 5 wounded and 190 other ranks killed or wounded.  The following day the whole area was continuously and heavily shelled.  During the night 31st-1st September the Battalion was relieved by a battalion of the 12th Brigade.  The relief was appalling, much delayed by shelling with both high explosive and gas and was not completed until 5.45 a.m. on 1st when the remains of the Battalion went into reserve at Monchy-le-Preux.  Its strength was now reduced to some 300 men, all of whom were totally exhausted.  In spite of this, and their desperate need for rest, when the attack on the Drocourt-Queant line itself was scheduled for the following day, the Somersets were ordered forward to be in support.  Their total casualties between August 28th and 4th September had amounted to 15 officers (4 remaining on duty) and 313 other ranks.

      Everard Wyrall, writing in his account ‘The Somerset Light Infantry 1914-1919’ gives us this verdict on the Battle of the Drocourt-Queant Switch.

‘By the end of August, the 1st British Army had gained the high ground east of Cherisy and Haucourt, had captured Eterpigny and cleared the area between the Sensee and Scarpe rivers.  Our troops were within assaulting distance of the powerful trench system running from the Hindenburg Line at Queant to the defences about Drocourt, called by the enemy the Wotan line.  Built in 1917 the Wotan Line was indeed powerful from its northern extremity about Drocourt to the east of Monchy in the direction of Bullecourt where it joined up with the Hindenburg (Siegfried) Line.  It was a portion of this line which the 4th Division attacked on the morning of 2nd September.  The 1st Somersets, though terribly weak in numbers and very much exhausted, again displayed indomitable pluck in endeavouring to carry put a successful issue to the task allotted to the Battalion.’

      Private George Cole had managed to survive until the night of 31st September, but early in the morning of September 1st, during the course of the relief, he had been killed by shell fire.  His body was of course never found, and his name is recorded on the Vis-en-Artois Memorial which commemorates 9,822 men with no known grave who fell in the advance between 8th August and 11th November 1918 in Picardy and Artois between the river Somme and Loos.  Vis-en-Artois village lies on the straight main road from Arras to Cambrai about 10 kilometres south-east of Arras, at a point where the road crosses the River Sensee.  It is very near to the actual place where George Cole was killed moving back north of the road from the position at Eterpigny to the reserve lines at Monchy-le-Preux.  The Memorial, which is the back drop to the Vis-en-Artois British Cemetery, is in three parts, the concave screen wall carrying the stone panels on which the names are carved.  It is 26 feet high flanked by pylons 70 feet high.  The Stone of Remembrance stands exactly between the pylons and behind it, in the middle of the screen, is a group in relief representing St George and the Dragon.  The flanking parts of the screen wall are also curved and carry stone panels carved with names.  Each of them forms the back of a roofed colonnade; and at the far end of each is a small building.

7 June 2012